Supreme Court of Georgia
Jane Hansen, Public Information Officer
244 Washington Street, Suite 572
Atlanta, Georgia 30334
404-651-9385
hansenj@gasupreme.us

SUMMARIES OF OPINIONS

Published Monday, October 3, 2016

Please note: *Opinion summaries are prepared by the Public Information Office for the general public and news media. Summaries are not prepared for every opinion released by the Court, but only for those cases considered of great public interest. Opinion summaries are not to be considered as official opinions of the Court. The full opinions are available on the Supreme Court website at* www.gasupreme.us .

FULTON COUNTY V. CITY OF ATLANTA (S16A0689)

In a ruling today by the Supreme Court of Georgia, the City of Atlanta's attempts to annex property located in the **Fulton County** Industrial District have come to a halt.

In its unanimous decision, the high court has dismissed the City's lawsuit against the County and thrown out a Fulton County court order that had declared as "void" the Fulton County Industrial District that the Georgia legislature created by constitutional amendment 37 years ago.

Because the City has never passed a local ordinance to annex the property, "questions about merely proposed legislation present no justiciable controversy," or a controversy the court has the authority to resolve. Therefore, "we remand for the trial court to dismiss this nonjusticiable lawsuit," **Justice Keith Blackwell** writes in today's decision.

The Fulton County Industrial District is an area of high-value industrial development in the west central portion of Fulton County. The value of the land, which corresponds to high tax revenue, has helped fuel a dispute over its ownership. In 1979, a local constitutional amendment was passed by the state legislature and ratified by voters, protecting the district from municipal encroachment, or in other words, from annexation or incorporation by the City of Atlanta. The amendment did, however, allow for the taxation of properties within the Industrial District for education purposes.

In 1983, the State of Georgia adopted a new constitution, which no longer allowed for local amendments, but allowed for local amendments pre-dating that Constitution to be continued through certain avenues, such as a local act or ordinance. So in 1983, the General

Assembly also enacted House Bill 85, which was a local act that continued the 1979 local constitutional amendment.

In February 2015, House Bill 476 was introduced to repeal the 1979 local amendment, and therefore the establishment of the Fulton Industrial District. However, the bill was not adopted, and the City of Atlanta eventually filed a "declaratory lawsuit" against the County, asking the court to "declare" the local constitutional amendment invalid. The County filed a motion asking the court to dismiss the City's suit on the grounds that it was barred by sovereign immunity, the legal doctrine that protects local and state governments from being sued. The trial court, however, ruled in favor of the City. It denied the County's motion to dismiss the suit, declared the 1979 local amendment void, and held that the 1983 Act that continued the amendment was also void. Fulton County then appealed to the state Supreme Court, arguing that nearly 40 years after passage of the 1979 local constitutional amendment, the City was challenging it "to get the camel's nose into the tent" and thereby "pave the way for City annexation of property within the Fulton Industrial District into the City's taxing jurisdiction."

But with today's opinion, the case has been thrown out.

"It is settled principle of Georgia law that the jurisdiction of the courts is confined to justiciable controversies, and the courts may not properly render advisory opinions," the opinion says. In this case, the controversy between the City and County is based on *proposed* legislation, but under state law, an annexation requires the adoption of a municipal ordinance.

"It is undisputed that the City has not yet enacted such an ordinance, and rather than seeing the legislative process through to completion, it instead filed this lawsuit," the opinion says. "It did so for the sole purpose of testing its legislative authority to annex the property at issue here, as well as the validity of other 'potential future annexations' within the District. The courts certainly have jurisdiction in appropriate cases to consider the validity of annexation ordinances. But in this case, there simply is no annexation ordinance, the validity of which properly could be called into question."

"Here, the City's proposed annexation and the County's objection to that proposed annexation are just that, a proposal and an objection to a proposal," the opinion says. "The City simply wants to know whether this objection to its proposal – if its proposal were enacted – would have merit. Such a question is no more justiciable than an inquiry by the General Assembly about whether a proposed statute would be inconsistent with, for instance, the First Amendment. The courts are not legislative counsel, and they cannot answer such questions."

"The trial court should have dismissed this lawsuit," the opinion concludes. "Because it did not, we vacate its judgment, and we remand for the trial court to enter an order of dismissal."

Attorney for Appellant (Fulton County): Larry Ramsey, Kenneth Robin, Jerolyn Ferrari, Patrise Perkins-Hooker, Kaye Burwell, Cheryl Ringer, Marvin Harkins

Attorneys for Appellee (City of Atlanta): Emmet Bondurant, David Brackett, Robert Ashe, III, Robert Highsmith, Jr., Joseph Young

GEORGIACARRY.ORG., INC. v. ALLEN ET AL. (S16A1257)

Georgia's biggest gun-rights organization has lost its appeal before the Georgia Supreme Court in which it attempted to challenge the right of each member of Georgia's Code Revision Commission to continue to serve. The Commission, whose duties involve working with

publishers to ensure that Georgia's statutes are properly codified and published, is made up of a number of judges, lawyers and legislators, including Speaker of the House David Ralston.

In today's unanimous opinion, written by **Justice Harold Melton**, the high court has ruled that GeorgiaCarry.org, a non-profit organization that lobbies for legislation protecting gun owners' Second Amendment rights, has no standing to pursue the kind of legal action it wished to file to remove the individual Commission members from office.

In October 2015, Georgia Carry filed an "application" in **Fulton County** Superior Court seeking a "writ of quo warranto" against members of the Code Revision Commission, challenging the right of each Commission member to remain on the Commission. At the time, among the 15 members of the Commission was Superior Court Judge John D. Allen of Columbus. Georgia Carry alleged that each member of the Commission was "discharging both legislative and executive powers" in serving on the commission, in violation of the separation of powers. Georgia Carry's executive director testified that he believed certain bills in which his organization had an interest had not been codified correctly, although he gave no specifics. "There are political pressures brought to bear on the [Commission] from time to time, and it affects what happens," he testified. The trial court denied Georgia Carry's application, finding that the organization lacked standing to pursue the writ, and Georgia Carry then appealed to the state Supreme Court.

Under Georgia Code § 9-6-60, a writ of quo warranto may be issued to challenge a public official's authority to hold a particular office. The statute says it "may be granted only after the application by some person either claiming the office or interested therein."

In today's opinion, "we must determine whether Georgia Carry qualifies as a 'person either claiming the office [of the Commission members] or interested therein'…such that it would be authorized to pursue a writ of quo warranto." The Court concludes that "a straightforward reading of § 9-6-60 reveals that the legislature did not intend for a nonprofit corporation such as Georgia Carry to be considered a 'person' for purposes of pursuing a writ of quo warranto."

Instead, a "person" pursuing a writ of quo warranto must be someone capable of "claiming" the public office occupied by someone else or a "person" who is interested in the office. "The text itself suggests that, as only individual natural persons can hold or claim to hold a public office, only natural individual persons can be otherwise interested therein."

The opinion points out that although "Georgia Carry is not authorized to pursue a writ of quo warranto as a 'person' under § 9-6-60, this does not necessarily mean that Georgia Carry could not obtain standing as an *association* on behalf of its individual citizen and taxpayer members to pursue a writ of quo warranto."

However, the high court has concluded that Georgia Carry could not obtain standing on behalf of its members because it failed to show that the interests it seeks to protect are at all related to the Commission's purpose. In its Articles of Incorporation, Georgia Carry states that its purpose is to focus "on public interest matters of self-defense and gun laws of Georgia and the United States of America." The Commission's primary purpose is to "select and contract with a publisher to conduct a revision, codification, or recodification of the Code and laws of Georgia."

"The Commission has no stated purpose relating to changing the substantive content of any laws passed by the General Assembly, let alone specific laws relating to guns or self-defense," today's opinion says.

"Accordingly, we find that Georgia Carry has not satisfied the requirement that the interests that it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's purpose in any manner that would establish that it had associational standing to pursue a writ of quo warranto on behalf of its members," the opinion concludes. "We therefore affirm the trial court's decision to deny Georgia Carry's request to pursue a writ of quo warranto here."

Attorney for Appellant (Georgia Carry): John Monroe

Attorneys for Appellee (Allen et al.): Samuel Olens, Attorney General, Dennis Dunn, Dep. A.G., Russell Willard, Sr. Asst. A.G., Cristina Correia, Asst. A.G., Christian Fuller, Asst. A.G., Wayne Allen, Legislative Counsel, Elizabeth Howerton, Dep. Legis. Counsel, Shawn Story, Dep. Legis. Counsel

PIPPEN V. THE STATE (S16A1126)

The Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld the murder conviction and life prison sentence a Certified Nursing Assistant received in **Greene County** for her role in the death and severe elder abuse of a 75-year-old man.

Paulette Pippen appealed her convictions, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction, the trial judge gave erroneous instructions to jurors before their deliberations, and her trial attorney was ineffective.

But in today's opinion, **Justice Carol Hunstein** writes for a unanimous court, "We disagree."

According to the evidence at trial, 75-year-old Joseph Vernon Ray was severely mentally disabled, mute and unable to take care of himself. For about 15 years, he had lived in Greene County at the Jackson Personal Care Home, which was owned by Vernon and Emma Jackson. Pippen was a Certified Nursing Assistant who was responsible for Ray's daily care, which included bathing, dressing, grooming and feeding him, as well as cleaning his room and administering his medications. According to briefs filed in the case, during November and December 2010, work schedules later obtained by police showed that Pippen worked 12-hour shifts seven days a week. Rodney Gresham, who worked the night shift, was generally responsible for watching all the patients, including Ray, and provided additional assistance when needed.

Ray initially received first degree burns around Nov. 9, 2010 due to bathing in water that was too hot. Vernon Jackson told Pippen not to call for emergency services because he feared he would lose his business license. The next day, Vernon and Emma Jackson took Ray to his primary doctor for a previously scheduled check-up. Ray remained in his street clothes. However, the physician noticed a red area on Ray's lower right leg which he diagnosed as first-degree burns with an area of blistering that he said was second-degree burns. The doctor later testified the burn could not have happened within the past 24 hours because it had begun to heal.

On Nov. 26, 2010, the day after Thanksgiving, Ray's sister came from Virginia to visit her brother, as she usually did at that time of the year. She observed that he did not seem normal and was told he was not feeling well due to the arthritis in his knees. As Ray's next of kin and listed direct contact, she did not see any of his burns, nor was she informed about any of his injuries.

On Dec. 22, Vernon and Emma Jackson took Ray to Athens Regional Medical Center where it was noted that he was "very frail, very small, smelled very bad." Doctors found

extensive third degree burns on Ray's hip, thigh, calf and feet which appeared to be several weeks old, had a black, scabby appearance and smelled like rotting flesh. Severe bed sores had developed on top of the burn injuries. In addition, the doctors determined that Ray was malnourished, dehydrated, possibly in renal failure, and at risk for sepsis. Ray, who was not expected to survive, was immediately transferred to the Burn Center at the Doctors Hospital in Augusta.

Ray arrived at the hospital in a fetal position, and the physician was unable to straighten his body because the tendons were so contracted. Based on the severity of the constriction of his muscles, the bedsores, and large blood clots in his legs, the treating physician later testified at trial that Ray had likely been bedridden and not used his extremities for two to four weeks. The doctor concluded Ray suffered from multiple, stage four bedsores throughout the lower half of his body and also noted old burn patterns on his skin that had gone untreated. The bedsores were so severe and had become so infected that his bones and tendons were visible on portions of his body. On Dec. 29, 2010, Ray died from sepsis and organ failure related to infections stemming from his multiple bedsores. Personnel at the Doctors Hospital contacted law enforcement and reported that Ray had injuries consistent with elderly abuse.

In August 2011, Paulette Pippen, Vernon Jackson, Emma Jackson and Rodney Gresham were indicted for felony murder and cruelty to a person 65 years of age or older. At her trial, Pippen, who was tried separately, testified that the day Ray suffered his burn injuries that she informed Vernon Jackson of the burns. She said that in the mornings when she came to work, she often found Ray covered in urine and feces because he had not been turned during the night shift, which was Rodney Gresham's responsibility. Pippen testified that she reported all these issues to Vernon Jackson "several times" and asked that Ray be taken to the hospital, but Jackson did nothing. She said she did not tell Ray's family or call 911 to report any of these issues because it was the home's policy to notify Jackson and then follow his instructions. She confirmed that after a few weeks, Ray was not eating well, began to small, and that portions of his skin had turned black. Following the three-day trial, Pippen was convicted of both charges and sentenced to life in prison. She then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court.

In today's opinion, the high court finds that "there was sufficient evidence to enable a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Pippen was guilty of the crime for which she was convicted." In response to her argument that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on a number of aspects of Georgia law, the Court finds no merit to her contentions. Finally, "We agree with the trial court that Pippen failed to demonstrate that her trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective," the opinion concludes. "Accordingly, Pippen's ineffectiveness claims are without merit."

Attorney for Appellant (Pippen): Kevin Anderson
Attorneys for Appellee (State): Stephen Bradley, District Attorney, Allison Mauldin, Chief Asst. D.A., Samuel Olens, Attorney General, Beth Burton, Dep. A.G., Paula Smith, Sr. Asst. A.G.

FOSTER V. THE STATE (S16A0712)

The Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld the felony murder conviction of a man found guilty of beating to death his girlfriend's 15-month-old baby boy.

Michael Angelo Foster, who was about 21 at the time of the crime, argues that the evidence at his **Grady County** trial was insufficient to convict him. But in today's opinion, the high court disagrees.

"The evidence was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find Foster guilty of the crime of which he was convicted beyond a reasonable doubt," **Justice Harold Melton** writes for a unanimous court.

According to the evidence, Foster's girlfriend, April Lewis, and her 15-month-old son, Malcolm, lived with Foster in the home of his mother and stepfather. On Aug. 16, 2002, Malcolm was left in Foster's care while Lewis and Foster's parents were at work. During the afternoon, a neighbor, Foster's brother and two others came to the house to play cards and drink beer. The neighbor later said he saw the toddler walking around and playing while they were there. The neighbor's sister also came by a little later that day and saw Malcolm sleeping. She said he looked "fine." After they all left, Foster was alone with the baby.

At around 10 that night, Foster took the little boy to the neighbors' house and said Malcolm had stopped breathing. Foster said he had left Malcolm alone in the bathtub to answer the phone, and when he returned, he had found the baby lying face down in the tub. However, the child wasn't wet when he brought him to the neighbor's house. One of the neighbors called 911 while another gave Malcolm CPR until emergency responders arrived 15-to-20 minutes later. Upon their arrival, Malcolm was unresponsive and had no pulse. The responders noticed the baby had discolorations across his forehead and on his abdomen. Malcolm was rushed to Grady General Hospital in Cairo, where emergency room personnel found him in full cardiac arrest and still not breathing. A nurse later testified that she noticed bruises on the child's head, abdomen, and neck, and suspecting child abuse, called law enforcement. The toddler could not be revived and was pronounced dead.

A Georgia Bureau of Investigation medical examiner performed the autopsy, in which he observed numerous bruises appearing to be knuckle or grip injuries on the child's forehead and abdomen. He had a subdural hematoma, multiple retinal hemorrhages, and a large amount of bleeding in his abdominal cavity that was likely caused by a punch to the stomach. Additionally, the child had fresh and healing injuries to his liver and rib fractures that had likely been caused by someone shaking or squeezing him. The medical examiner concluded that the fatal injuries had occurred no more than 20-to-30 minutes before Malcolm quit breathing. There was no evidence of drowning. Rather, Malcolm's death was caused by head trauma and blunt force chest and abdominal injuries.

In December 2002, a Grady County jury found Foster guilty of felony murder and cruelty to a child in the first degree, and he was sentenced to life in prison.

In his appeal, in addition to arguing that the evidence against him was insufficient, Foster also argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to postpone the trial so he could obtain an expert witness to evaluate the autopsy results reached by the State's crime lab.

"We disagree," today's opinion says. "Here, the record reveals that Foster's counsel announced 'ready' on the day that the trial began without seeking any ruling on his motion for a continuance." Furthermore, because "Foster 'made no showing as to who the expert would be, what his or her testimony would be expected to show, or how that testimony would benefit [him],' the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance in this case," the opinion concludes.

Attorney for Appellant (Foster): Richard Parker, Georgia Public Defender Council
Attorneys for Appellee (State): Joseph Mulholland, District Attorney, Moruf Oseni, Asst. D.A., Samuel Olens, Attorney General, Beth Burton, Dep. A.G., Paula Smith, Sr. Asst. A.G., Aimee Sobhani, Asst. A.G.

KENNEDY, WARDEN V. PRIMACK (S16A0821)

The Supreme Court of Georgia has ruled in favor of a woman sentenced to 10 years in prison for failing to seek medical help for her 4-year-old daughter after her boyfriend broke the child's leg.

With today's unanimous ruling, written by **Justice Harold Melton**, the high court has upheld a lower court's order that threw out the woman's guilty plea after determining she did not make it "knowingly and voluntarily." As a result, she is now entitled to have her case tried before a jury or enter a new plea.

The case is from **Bulloch County**, where the city of Statesboro is the county seat. According to briefs filed in the case, in late May 2012, concerned bystanders witnessed 23-year-old Esther Primack pushing her 4-year-old daughter in a stroller. They noticed that the child, N.P., appeared to be in significant pain. After Primack refused to let them take her to the hospital, they called the Statesboro Police Department and directed officers to the Deluxe Inn where Primack and her boyfriend, Jerome Swan, were staying with Primack's daughter, and the couple's younger child. Officers disovered N.P. lying on the bed in obvious pain. A detective testified the little girl's leg was mangled and swollen, and she was unable to hold her leg out straight. N.P. was transferred to the hospital where she had surgery and was placed in a body cast. Investigators later determined that Swan had thrown the child on the ground and broken her leg. According to testimony from the Bulloch County Foster Care case manager, when N.P. came into the State's custody, her teeth were brown and had holes in them, and she required 10 procedures for gum infections and numerous cavities. According to testimony, N.P.'s mother had been feeding her dog food, and the child did not appear bonded to her mother.

Primack was indicted by a grand jury on July 9, 2012 on one count of cruelty to children in the second degree based on her allegedly "criminally negligent" failure to seek medical treatment for her child. Swan was charged with aggravated assault and first-degree child cruelty for allegedly breaking the little girl's leg and allowing her to suffer. On Nov. 20, 2012, Primack entered a "non-negotiated" guilty plea. (Unlike a "negotiated plea," in which the prosecutor and defense attorney agree on the sentence they will recommend to the judge, a non-negotiated plea is one in which the defendant pleads guilty without an agreement from the prosecutor regarding the recommended sentence.) Following her plea, the judge sentenced Primack to the maximum of 10 years in prison. After retaining a new lawyer, Primack filed a motion to modify the plea but the trial court denied it. In April 2015, Primack filed a petition for a "writ of habeas corpus." (Habeas corpus is a civil proceeding that allows already convicted prisoners to challenge their conviction on constitutional grounds in the county where they're incarcerated. They generally file the action against the prison warden, who in this case was Kathleen Kennedy.) In her habeas petition, Primack argued her trial attorney rendered "ineffective assistance of counsel" for failing to do several things, including failing to present evidence that Swan had also abused her and she was the victim of Battered Persons Syndrome. Primack also argued her guilty plea had been "unknowingly and involuntarily" entered, as she did not understand the "criminal negligence"

element of the charge to which she pleaded guilty. Following a hearing, the habeas court ruled in her favor and granted her relief, throwing out her guilty plea. The state Attorney General's office, on behalf of the warden, then appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court.

Under the law, today's opinion says, a guilty plea must be "voluntary, knowing, and intelligent." The accused must have sufficient awareness of the likely consequences of her plea, including that by pleading guilty, she waives certain constitutional rights, including her right to a trial by jury. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "if a defendant's guilty plea is not equally voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. Moreover, because a guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, *it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts.*"

Primack was charged with cruelty to children in the second degree. Under Georgia Code § 16-5-70, a person commits the crime "when such person with *criminal negligence* causes a child under the age of 18 cruel or excessive physical or mental pain." In today's opinion, the high court agrees that the habeas court "had a proper basis for concluding that Primack did not possess a sufficient understanding of the law in relation to those facts in order to render her plea voluntary."

Specifically, during her guilty plea hearing, Primack asked the judge and her attorney: "What is criminal negligence?" The judge responded, "It is negligence that goes beyond gross negligence and rises to the level of criminal negligence." The judge acknowledged that his answer was "a law school answer, I suppose," adding, "It's a gross deviation from the standard." Her attorney agreed, "That's basically what it boils down to is that the legislature has said something of this magnitude is a crime…."

No one asked Primack if she understood what they meant, and she later testified at the habeas hearing that she did not. "Nor are we persuaded that the answers given by the trial court and defense counsel…were sufficient to allow Primack to 'possess an understanding of the law in relation to the facts' of her case," today's opinion says. "The definitions offered by the trial court and defense counsel simply did not convey any of the concepts that define 'criminal negligence' in any straightforward or readily discernable way to a defendant who specifically asked what the term meant."

"Accordingly, we conclude that the record supports the habeas court's finding that Primack was not adequately informed that her failure to seek medical care for her child had to rise to a level of 'willful, wanton, or reckless disregard for the safety' of her daughter in order for Primack to have acted with the necessary 'criminal negligence' to be found guilty of second degree cruelty to children," the opinion concludes. "We therefore uphold the habeas court's decision to grant relief to Primack based on her argument that she did not enter her guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently." The opinion states that given this ruling, the Court does not need to address the additional reasons the habeas court threw out her guilty plea.

Attorney for Appellant (Warden): Samuel Olens, Attorney General, Beth Burton, Dep. A.G., Paula Smith, Sr. Asst. A.G., Vicki Bass Asst. A.G.

Attorneys for Appellees (Primack): W. Keith Barber, Cris Schneider

****

IN OTHER CASES, the Supreme Court of Georgia has upheld **murder** convictions and life prison sentences for:

* Nathaniel Brittian (Clarke Co.) **BRITTIAN V. THE STATE (S16A0950)**
* Tommie Lee Bullard (Miller Co.) **BULLARD V. THE STATE (S16A0797)**
* Octavious Turner (Fulton Co.) **TURNER V. THE STATE (S16A1349)**
(While the Supreme Court has upheld Turner's murder conviction, it is sending the case back to the trial court to fix a sentencing error. In addition to sentencing Turner to life in prison, the trial court must also sentence him for the charge of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.)
* Deron Wallace (Lowndes Co.) **LOWNDES V. THE STATE (S16A0654)**
(The Supreme Court has also upheld Wallace's conviction of murder and armed robbery, as well as his prison sentence of life plus five years. But again, the trial court made a sentencing error by failing to merge the counts of theft by taking into the armed robbery for sentencing purposes because they involved the same transaction. As a result, the high court is throwing out his convictions and sentences for theft by taking.)

IN DISCIPLINARY MATTERS, the Georgia Supreme Court has **disbarred** the following attorneys:

* Ted B. Herbert **IN THE MATTER OF: TED B. HERBERT (S16Y1820)**

* Christopher G. Nicholson **IN THE MATTER OF: CHRISTOPHER G. NICHOLSON (S16Y1446)**

The Court has accepted a petition for **voluntary surrender of license** – tantamount to disbarment – from attorney:

* Lyle Vincent Anderson **IN THE MATTER OF: LYLE VINCENT ANDERSON (S15Y1181)**

The Court has ordered the **suspension concurrent with the 30-month suspension** already being served by attorney:

* Ricardo L. Polk **IN THE MATTER OF: RICARDO L. POLK (S16Y1734)**

The Court has accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and ordered the **180-day suspension with conditions** of attorney:

* L. Nicole Brantley **IN THE MATTER OF: L. NICOLE BRANTLEY (S16Y1235, S16Y1236, S16Y1237, S16Y1238, S16Y1239)**

The Court has accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and ordered the **three-month suspension** of attorney:

* Daniel J. Saxton **IN THE MATTER OF DANIEL J. SAXTON (S16Y1575)**

The Court has accepted a petition for voluntary discipline and ordered a **Review Panel reprimand** of attorney:

* Nicole Jones **IN THE MATTER OF: NICOLE JONES (S16Y1273)**

The Court has rejected **petitions for voluntary discipline** from attorneys:

* Clarence R. Johnson, Jr. **IN THE MATTER OF: CLARENCE R. JOHNSON, JR. (S16Y1709)**

* Emmanuel Lucas West **IN THE MATTER OF: EMMANUEL LUCAS WEST (S16Y1184)**